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MAHARAL'S CONCEPTION OF 
THE HUMAN BEING] 
Joshua L. Golding 
This paper discusses Maharal's conception of the human being and its four 
major aspects, namely body, soul, intellect, and tselem (image or form). I 
suggest that some of his apparently inconsistent remarks concerning the 
human body may be reconciled by distinguishing two different senses of 
badness or evil. Secondly, I show that Maharal embraces what might be 
termed "moderate rationalism." Thirdly, I elucidate his conception of the 
tselem by discussing parallel ideas in Kabbalistic literature. 
1. 
The writings of Rabbi Judah Loew of Prague (c.1520-c.1609), often 
referred to as "Maharal" (a Hebrew acronym for "our master, the Rabbi 
Loew") represent a unique and creative blend of doctrines and ideas 
drawn from Hebrew Scripture, Talmud, and Midrash; from the Jewish 
philosophical tradition, typified by the work of Moses Maimonides; 
from Jewish reactions against Maimonides' philosophy such as that of 
Hasdai Crescas; and from Kabbalistic literature, especially the Bahir, the 
Zohar, and the work of R. Meir Ibn Gabbai (1480-c.1545). Maharal has 
been acknowledged as influential on later trends such as Hassidism and 
the thought of Rabbi Abraham I. Kook, the twentieth century spiritual 
and intellectual leader of Religious Zionism. In the history of Jewish 
thought, Maharal is an interesting and important figure, despite the fact 
that not much (especially in English) has been written on his work.2 
One of the central topics in Maharal's writings is his conception of the 
human being. In this paper I shall sketch the basic outlines of Maharal's 
conception of the human being. This paper is by no means an attempt at 
a definitive description, which would require the length of a book. My 
focus will be on certain aspects of his account which I think are philo-
sophically intriguing, and which bear on his conception of what is the 
best relationship with God for the human being. To bring out some of its 
unique features, I shall compare and contrast some aspects of his 
account with that of Moses Maimonides on the one hand, and 
Kabbalistic literature on the other. In the process of elucidating 
Maharal's view, I aim to correct what I think is a serious flaw in some 
recent discussions of Maharal's attitude toward one aspect of the human 
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being, namely, reason or rationality. I shall try to show that while some 
scholars have painted Maharal as something of an anti-rationalist, in fact 
he embraced what might be termed moderate rationalism. 
Any account of the human being from a Jewish perspective must be 
judged on the basis of how well the account fits with traditional Jewish 
texts, and how well it fits with lived human reflection and experience. In 
this paper, I shall not aim to argue that Maharal's account of the human 
being is adequate in these respects. Rather, I shall aim for the more mod-
est goal of sympathetically describing Maharal's account and emphasiz-
ing some of its unique features. A full scale evaluation of his view must 
be left for another occasion. 
II. 
Let us turn then to Maharal's conception of the human being. In many 
places in his writings/ Maharal claims the human being is made up of 
three parts, namely, the body (guj), the soul (nefesh), and the intellect 
(sekhe/). However, in at least one passage,' Maharal claims there is a 
fourth aspect as well, namely, the image or form (fselem), which, as we 
shall see, is not reducible to any of the other three parts, and which, in 
some sense, transcends them. I shall consider, in turn, the body, soul, and 
intellect; and then turn to Maharal's conception of the image or form. 
First, the body. The body is the material part of the human being.5 Like 
any matter, the human body takes up a certain amount of physical space; 
it comes to be and passes away. In general, matter may be ranked accord-
ing to its degree of grossness or refinement; for example, the matter of the 
celestial spheres is purer than the matter on the earth. Light, especially 
from the heavenly bodies, is the purest kind of matter on earth, and it is, 
qua matter, superior to other material things.6 Some human beings have a 
more refined body than others; for example, Israelites generally have a 
more refined body than gentiles; Moses had a more refined body than 
other Israelites. 7 Human beings have the ability to purify or refine the 
body through proper behavior. Indeed, Maharal claims the function of 
many divine commandments is to refine or purify the body. 8 While 
Maharal accepts the doctrine of bodily resurrection, he apparently thinks 
that one's physical body does not remain in the world to come, since, he 
claims, that world is completely separate from matter. 9 
What does it mean to say that material bodies can be more or less 
gross or refined? Maharal appears to intend this literally: light from the 
heavens is actually less dense than that of the earth; Moses's body was 
actually less dense than the typical human body. Why should difference 
in density constitute a significant difference in value? The more dense a 
body is, the more it is subject to the finite limits and constrictions of 
space; the more something is bound by finitude, the more remote it is 
from God, the infinite, absolute simplicity. Light is therefore a symbol of 
God's revelation and presence. Of course, such ideas are not original in 
Maharal; they may be found in many earlier writers as well.lO 
What is Maharal's attitude toward the status or value of the body? Is 
the body basically good, bad, or neutral? In one place, Maharal has 
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some apparently rather negative things to say about the body: 
" ... the good [human] qualities are called matters of affliction, since 
they afflict man so that he will not follow the desire of his body, and 
they are called "the way of life" ... for anything which afflicts and 
diminishes his body will cause him to reach the "life"; for death and 
negation cleave to the body."11 
An even harsher statement occurs in his commentary to Chapter 1 of the 
Talmudic tractate known as Pirkei Avot (Ethics of the Fathers): 
" ... the Torah is called "good" because it is completely intellectual 
... for a thing which is intellectually separate from matter complete-
ly is completely good, and thus the Torah is good in particular; and 
the opposite of this is that a thing which is material is completely 
bad (ra) .... for badness cleaves to matter.. .. By means of the Torah a 
person may become intellectually separate from matter, and then 
he is a whole, good creature, and existence is fitting to him .... "12 
Passages such as these recur throughout Maharal's works. However, in 
other places Maharal seems to express a rather positive attitude toward 
the body. Later in the same work,13 Maharal writes that despite the fact 
that the human is a partly physical being, he or she is superior to angels 
because only the human is created in the divine image or form (tselem). 
For Mahara!, this "form" involves some special divine and transcendent 
"light" which cleaves only to the human, precisely because the human is 
a material being. (Later in this paper I shall discuss Maharal's notion of 
the tselem in more detail.) In the course of his discussion Maharal explic-
itly takes up the question that his position here seems inconsistent with 
his earlier claim (quoted above) that the body is inferior to that which is 
not material. That is, if the body is inferior to the non-bodily, how can 
the human being be superior to an angel? His answer: the body itself is 
inferior; the tselem or transcendent "light" which makes the human 
superior to the angels is not physical. However, the fact remains that the 
form or image requires a body as a substrate. This seems to indicate a 
more postive attitude toward the body. Furthermore, in several places, 
Maharal defends at length the claim that performance of bodily com-
mandments is necessary for acheiving a "bonding" (devekut) with God. 14 
In yet another passage, Maharal disagrees with "those who say that 
the act of union between man and woman is shameful" and those who 
go so far as to say that the "sense of touch is a shame" to the human 
being. IS Although he does not mention him by name, the target of this 
criticism appears to be Maimonides, who, citing Aristotle on this subject, 
says exactly these things. l6 Maharal claims that the sages of the Talmud 
did not view intercourse as despicable, except insofar as a person inten-
tionally engages in intercourse for the sake gratifying his own desire, 
rather than for the sake of procreation or for the sake of some divine pur-
pose. Maharal writes that, in and of itself, the act of intercourse is not 
despicable; on the contrary it is "the foundation upon which everything 
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is built."!7 Furthermore, he writes that there is nothing despicable about 
the male sexual organ, except insofar as a person lusts after sexual gratifi-
cation. Presumably he intends the same point about the sense of touch 
and the body generally. That is, in and of itself, the body is not despica-
ble; what is despicable is using the body for the sake of gratification. 
While Maharal clearly derides gratification, here he appears to assert that 
the the body is, in and of itself, a good thing and not a bad thing. 
Can these passages be reconciled with the earlier ones? I:Iaggai Ben-
Artsi has discussed this problem.18 Citing other scholars as well, Ben-
Artsi has noted that passages in Maharal's writings seem to support 
three very different views about how man should relate to the body: 1) 
One should remove oneself as much as possible from the body 
(Asceticism). 2) One should find a balance between the spiritual and the 
bodily (Harmony). 3) One should sanctify the body (kiddush ha-I:KJmer). 
Ben-Artsi suggests that all three views are genuinely in Maharal; his res-
olution consists in the proposal that these represent three developmental 
stages in the human's spiritual progress. IY That is, one must first learn to 
be an ascetic; after one has mastered physical temptation, one may then 
strive to achieve a balance, and finally, one may then strive to achieve 
the highest goal, sanctification of the physical. 
In effect, Ben-Artsi limits or qualifies the passages that seem to indi-
cate that the body is bad, by saying that this applies only at an early 
stage of spiritual development. Indeed, it appears that any attempted 
resolution will have to qualify Maharal's statements about the badness 
of the body. Nevertheless, I beg to differ from Ben-Artsi's suggestion; it 
seems to me that for Maharal, even at the highest stage of spiritual 
development, in some respects a certain kind of asceticism, or denial of 
the body, remains applicable. But perhaps the negative passages about 
the body may be qualified in a different way. A distinct possibility is 
that, like many other philosophers and theologians before him, Maharal 
uses two different senses of the term bad (ra); the body might be inher-
ently bad in one sense and not inherently bad in another sense.20 Let us 
take note that Maharal accepts the notion there is some sort of equation 
between Goodness and Being; entities that have greater being are better 
than entities with lesser being.21 Of the three parts of man, the body is 
the most removed or distant from God, who is the absolutely simple 
being.22 Matter is finite, composite; God is not. This means that, in one 
sense, matter or the body is inherently "bad". On the other hand, the 
intentional turning away from God toward that which is limited, is "bad" 
in another sense; a sense which we might more readily designate by the 
term "sinful". Clearly, Maharal intends such a distinction, for he claims 
that aside from the fact that the body is limited and therefore in some 
sense ''bad'', there is a destructive, metaphysical force, namely Satan, 
which seeks to drive the human being away from God and toward death 
and nothingess.23 Now the body is not, in this sense, inherently "evil", 
for in and of itself the body does not turn away from God. On the con-
trary, the body is in this sense good, for it is the necessary substrate of 
the human image or form, which (as we shall see later) is the highest 
and most noble point of contact between God and all creation. Thus, 
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when Maharal indicates that the body is bad, he means that it is limited 
and finite; when he indicates that the body is not bad, he means that 
despite its finitude, it plays a significant role in a positive relationship 
between the human being and God. (Admittedly, the weakness in this 
solution is that nowhere, to my knowledge, does Maharal explicitly dis-
ambiguate two senses of the term "bad".) 
II. 
Next, let us turn briefly to the soul Cnefesh). Relative to his discussion 
of the human body and intellect, Maharal spends little time on the soul, 
so I shall have relatively little to say about it here. Maharal believes that 
that the soul is a distinct element in the human being. Certain divine 
commandments pertain specifically to the SOUP4 Drawing generously 
from the philosophical traditon, Maharal says that the soul is the source 
of motion in the body, and that it is the seat of the emotions.25 Maharal 
also writes that the soul is a power or force in the body.26 This would 
seem to imply that, for Maharal, the soul does not remain in existence 
after death in the world to come, since that world is completely separate 
from materiality.27 So much for a brief discussion of the soul. 
III. 
Let us turn now to the intellect (sekhel). Basically, the intellect is the 
power to rationally comprehend ideas and doctrines, especially the 
Torah, which is an expression of God's intellect.28 Certain command-
ments pertain especially to the intellect; and it is part of human comple-
tion (hashlamah) to exercise the intellect; study of the Torah is the main 
commandment which pertains to and perfects the intellect.29 At least to 
some extent, the intellect is capable of comprehending necessity, infinity, 
and in some way, God himself. Relative to the soul and body, the intel-
lect is the least subject to time, space, and contingency. Therefore, the 
intellect has a greater kinship with God than does the soul or body. It 
follows that the intellect is superior to soul or body. Maharal claims to 
find ample support for this claim in Talmudic passages which stress the 
significance of the study of Torah?O Needless to say, it is also the case 
that the doctrine of the superiority of the intellect has philosophical 
roots in Plato and Aristotle. 
Clearly, one of the implications of the view that the intellect is superi-
or to body and soul is that, for Maharal, the intellect plays an important 
role in one's relationship with God. Despite this, some scholars have 
portrayed Maharal as something of an anti-rationalist. Writing about 
what he refers to as the sixteenth century "conflict" between Jewish 
mysticism and Jewish philosophy, Andre Neher sets up an opposition 
between "reason" on the one hand and "mysticism" on the other.31 He 
then suggests that Maharal "sought to widen the gap between the two, 
so that triumphant mysticism might the more easily throw philosophy 
onto the rubbish heap."32 More recently, Byron Sherwin has written, 
"For Loew, Jewish philosophy and rationalism are useless distortions of 
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Judaism, unworthy of legitimacy or even toleration."33 I shall try to show 
here that Neher and Sherwin have misconstrued Maharal's intentions. 
This task is important for this paper because it helps clarify Maharal's 
subtle perspective on the intellect and its proper role in one's relation-
ship with God. 
Neher bases his claim that Maharal sought to reject reason in favor of 
mysticism on passages in which Maharal argues against the view that 
God's essence is identical with his intellect, and in favor of the view that 
the intellect is only one of God's many attributes.34 Maharal cites the 
Zohar and the Kabbalist R. Meir Ibn Gabbai in the course of supporting 
his view, and vehemently disputes those who would claim that the 
Kabbalists and the philosophers are saying the same things but in two 
different languages. 's Indeed Maharal insists that the things being said 
by the Kabbalah and the philosophers are diametrically opposed. 
Clearly, Maharal here disputes the view of the "philosophers", and 
defends the view of the Kabbalah that God's intellect is not identical 
with His essence. Perhaps this does represent a profound religious dif-
ference. However, it is a serious mistake to construe Maharal's argument 
as a broadside against "reason" and in favor of "mysticism". We must 
bear in mind that the term "Kabbalah" does not properly translate as 
"mysticism", which sometimes carries the insinuation of anti-rational-
ism. "Kabbalah" translates as "that which is received" or "tradition"; 
and it is entirely possible that "that which is received" may be rationally 
defensible. Indeed, Maharal defends the Kabbalistic view of the divine 
attributes on rational grounds; he argues that this view makes more sense, 
primarily because it is more consistent with the doctrine of the unity or 
simplicity of God. In other words, when Maharal says that "philosophy" 
and Kabbalah are diametrically opposed, he means that they are 
opposed on the issue at hand, namely the question of whether God's intel-
lect is identical with God's attributes. When Maharal disputes the 
"philosophers", he does not intend to impugn rational inquiry or "rea-
son" per se; rather, he means to dispute the views of a certain group of 
thinkers known as "philosophers". (Just as medieval writers often used 
the term "the philosopher" to refer specifically to Aristotle, so too the 
term "philosophers" here refers to a specific group of thinkers, typified 
by Maimonides.) No implication is intended that only "philosophers" 
attempt to support their views on rational grounds.36 
We may further appreciate Maharal's perspective on the human intel-
lect by considering his approach toward the question of whether God's 
existence can be rationally demonstrated. Sherwin claims that Maharal 
"assumes God as the only certain existent and never conceives of 
demonstrating His existence" .37 He also claims that Maharal "viewed 
attempts by Jewish philosophers to demonstrate the existence of God as 
a needless endeavor and as a potential threat to already affirmed reli-
gious beliefs."38 As evidence for his claim, Sherwin cites Maharal's cri-
tique of one of Maimonides' proofs which (on Maharal's reading) 
requires the assumption that the heavenly spheres are eternally in 
motion.39 Maharal crticizes this proof on the grounds that the assump-
tion contradicts other traditional Jewish beliefs. Sherwin infers that 
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Maharal found the quest for proofs of God's existence threatening to 
Judaism. However, Sherwin's argument is flawed; from the fact that 
Maharal criticizes a proof for God's existence, it does not follow that he 
is uninterested in finding a good proof. Moreover, after criticizing 
Maimonides' proof, Maharal proceeds not only to give a different proof 
for God's existence, but also to attribute that proof to the sages of the 
Talmud, and to claim that this proof is far superior to anything the 
"philosophers" have suggested!40 Like Neher, Sherwin has misconstrued 
a critique of a view held by some "philosophers" as an indictment of 
rationality per se. 
What was Maharal's approach toward the reasonability of accepting 
the doctrine of the divine revelation of the Torah? In discussing those 
who reject divine revelation, Maharal writes: 
"There are men of analytic bent who folow their reason. They are 
called philosophers. They wish to enlighten themselves concerning 
the order and reality of things until they find truth. But they are fool-
ish and walk in darkness. If they really had an interest in wisdom 
they would acknowledge revelation as their principle and would no 
longer grope in darkness."41 
Sherwin construes this as a sort of fidiestic argument that only revela-
tion as opposed to reason can be the basis of belief. However, this is 
quite mistaken. In the context, this passage is an introduction by 
Maharal of an elaborate attempt to give rational proofs for the claim that 
there must be divinely revealed commandments, mainly on telological 
grounds that without divine revelation, the human being cannot reach 
true completion or perfection. Maharal aims to criticize the "philoso-
phers" on their own grounds; thus he writes "if they really had an inter-
est in wisdom", which is to say, "if they really thought things through 
well enough," they would come to the conclusion that - given certain 
assumptions which (he believes) both he and they accept - revelation 
must occur. This is not an argument for revelation and against reason; it 
is an introduction to an argument that there there are reasonable 
grounds to believe in revelation. (A full account of that argument is 
beyond the scope of this paper.) 
Perhaps a stronger case for the claim that Maharal is an anti-rational-
ist might have been made on the basis of his discussion of the reasons 
for commandments. In one place, Maharal writes that we cannot expect 
to understand the reasons for all the commandments, because they go 
beyond the human intellect."2 However, even here he ultimately suggests 
that there is a divine intelligence which dictates the commandmentsY 
We are left with the view that even if some of the commandments don't 
make sense to us, they do make sense to God; otherwise God would not 
command them. So, according to Maharal, human reason unaided by 
revelation would never conceive of many of the commandments. There 
is a sense, then, in which Maharal believes that without revelation, 
human reason is too weak to know everything that is true and good. But 
by the same token, Maharal also believes that some of the main princi-
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pIes of the Torah can be rationally defended or substantiated, including 
the principle of revelation itself. 
A brief contrast between Maharal and R. Meir Ibn Gabbai is instruc-
tive here. As we have already seen, Maharal acknowledges R. Meir as 
one of his sources. Now the latter argued quite vehemently against the 
use of unaided human intelligence in the quest to understand God:14 R. 
Meir claimed that only Kabbalah, tradition, can guide one to the truth. 
He went so far as to reject the study of "philosophy" altogether.45 To my 
knowledge, we do not find the same sort of argument in Maharal's 
works. Thus, it is accurate to say that Maharal is more of a rationalist 
than R. Meir. 
Having said this, it is nonetheless also accurate to say that Maharal is 
lcss of a rationalist than Maimonides. For one thing, Maharal is less 
interested than Maimonides in giving proofs for God's existence. And 
again, Maharal does not think that God's essence is identical with his 
intellect, as Maimonides indicates in several places;'" as we shall see 
later, Maharal also does not think that the human essence is identical 
with the human intellect. While he attaches great significance to the 
intellect and the intellectual pursuit of God, he characterizes the ultimate 
end of the human as dcvckut, i.e., "bonding" or "cleaving" to God. This 
has an intellectual component, but it goes beyond the intellect as well. 
We may say then that Maharal embraces a form of moderate ratonalism. 
This notion will be elaborated in the final section of this paper. 
IV. 
Let us turn, finally, to the human "image" or "form" (tselcm):7 To 
repeat, in many places Maharal states that the human has three parts. 
But he makes clear in one passage that the tsclcm is a fourth aspect. I 
believe the explanation of this has to do with the fact that the tse/cm is 
not a "part" of the human being in the same sense as are the body, soul 
and intellect. Rather the tsclcm is the form (tsurah) of the human being, 
the most basic aspect of human identity.48 Thus, when Maharal intends 
to speak of the "parts" of the human being, he will often neglect to men-
tion the tse/cm, precisely because it is not a "part" in the same sense as 
the others. Tn any case, the tse/cm is emphatically not the intellect.49 
Maharal sharply disagrees with Maimonides on this point. In the same 
vein, as we saw earlier, Maharal disagrees with Maimonides' claim in 
the Guidc that God's essence is identical with His Intellect. For Maharal, 
God's intellect is one among many of the manifestations or ways in 
which God reveals himself to the world. It is no accident that Maharal's 
disagreement with Maimonides concerns both human and divine 
nature. Again, it may legitimately be said that Maharal is less of a ratio-
nalist than Maimonides. However, it does not follow that Maharal deni-
grates the intellect, nor that he supposes that the human intellect is weak 
or ineffectual. Of course, he believes the human intellect is limited and 
finite, but so does Maimonides. 
Aside from speaking of the tsclcm as the tsurah or "form" of the 
human being, Maharal also speaks of the tsclcm as a "transcendent light" 
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(or nivdaO which, of all creation including angels and animals, only the 
human being possesses.50 It is of course not a physical light; Maharal 
makes clear that the term "light" is a way of talking about a spiritual, or 
non-material aspect of human identity. In virtue of the tselem, the human 
is capable of a unique relationship with God. Maharal further claims 
that this tselem is possessable to a greater or lesser degree; that is, it can 
be virtually lost and then regained depending on one's behavior. In par-
ticular, the Patriarchs and, in general, the descendants of Israel maintain 
the tselem; whereas the gentiles, in general, possess it to a lesser degree.51 
Maharal relates this notion to several Talmudic parables or midrashim.52 
It is said that the souls of the righteous are directly underneath the divine 
"throne of glory". It is also said that the form of Jacob the Partiarch's 
face cleaves to the throne. Interpreting these parables, Maharal says that 
the nearness and kinship to the "throne of glory" signifies a nearness 
and kinship to the divine being, and a particular suitability to receive 
revelation and to achieve devekut or cleaving to God. The tselem consti-
tutes the human being's most fundamental connection with God; the full 
realization of that connection is devekut. The tselem is the holiest and 
most noble aspect of the human being, and it signifies the potential for a 
place in the the world to come. It is because of the tselem that the human 
being is the focal point of all creation, and in virtue of the tselem, the 
human being is at least capable of reaching a more elevated status than 
the angels. Again, this is a point of difference between Maharal and 
Maimonides, for latter seems to think that the angels of glory are superi-
or to humans, and utterly rejects the notion that man is the focal point of 
creation.53 
According to Maharal, it is in virtue of possessing the tselem that the 
human being has free choice.54 Thus the human being is similar to God 
in a unique way; just as God is the King over all, the human is the king 
(by God's wish) over the globe. Angels do not possess free choice; this is 
another point of difference with Maimonides and agreement with R. 
Meir.'5 However, I think it would be a mistake to say that, for Maharal, 
the tselem just is the capacity for free choice.'" Rather, it seems that the 
tselem remains fundamentally irreducible and indefinable. Although he 
does not explicitly say so, Maharal's conception of the tselem and its rela-
tion to the three parts of the human being parallels the Kabbalistic con-
ception of the infinite divine essence (the eyn sot> and its relation to the 
divine attributes (sefirat).57 This conception is described, for example, in 
the work of R. Meir Ibn Gabbai, based on the Bahir and the Zahar.58 That 
is, we have the following analogy: The human tselem stands to the body, 
soul, and intellect, as the infinite, ineffable divine essence stands to the 
divine attributes. So, just as God is not essentially an intellectual being, 
nor a merciful being, nor a just being, nor, for that matter, a being who 
rules with free choice, so too the human is not essentially an intellectual 
being, nor an emotional being, nor a physical being, nor, for that matter, 
a being who acts with free choice. The tselem of the human, like the 
essence of God, is fundamentally indefinable. 
In a somewhat paradoxical fashion, Maharal claims that although the 
tselem itself is not a physical entity, it can subsist only in something that 
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is material. That is, the tselem requires a body. Again, this is similar to 
the Kabbalistic notion that in order to be made manifest, the Infinite 
divine essence requires a medium, namely, the ten divine attributes 
(sefirot). Moreover, Maharal says that certain particular aspects of the 
human body are expressive of the tselem. These include, the human face 
and the erect posture of the human being.59 Maharal claims that these 
aspects of the human body notably represent, in the first case, the spiri-
tual "light" or special relationship between God and the human, and, in 
the second case, the human's capacity for dominion or rulership over the 
globe, paralleling God's dominion over the universe. In any case, while 
these aspects of the human body represent the tselem, the tselem is not 
reducible to them. This fits with the Kabbalistic notion that while the 
infinite divine essence is represented by, but not reducible to, the ten 
divine attributes, these attributes make up the image of a "Primal Man", 
which is in turn symbolically represented by the human physique.60 
Maharal claims that just as the body is necessary as a substrate of the 
tselcm, so too the Torah, which is in reality a metaphysical entity, 
requires a material substrate, i.e., the physical human being who fulfills 
the word of the Torah. 
" ... The Torah, which is a transcendent intellect, requires a material 
substrate; and just as the image of God which is found in man and not 
angels requires a material receptor, so is it necessary for anything 
which is completely transcendent to have a receptor that is material."61 
We may ask, why is it necessary for the tselem to have a "material recep-
tor"? Maharal's answer lies in passages such as this one: 
" ... God is absolutely simple; therefore he chose lowly ones who are 
simple and have no high rank ... and therefore this [unique] con-
nection must be only with man who is flesh and blood .... "62 
The basic point seems to be that it is because the simplicity of God is 
absolute that it can best be made manifest within something that is most 
inferior, i.e., finite, physical reality. Similarly, in another passage, 
Maharal writes that the fact that God is the ultimate agent and cause of 
the universe is best made manifest not by the adoration of God by 
angels, but rather by the worship (avodah) of God by physical human 
beings, precisely because the physical human being is at the lowest level 
of the chain of agency and causation in the universeY A full discussion 
of these claims would require an analysis of Maharal's metaphysics, 
which I will not undertake here. For the present purpose, it must suffice 
to say that while Maharal identifies the tselem as the most elevated and 
transcendent aspect of the human being, he also claims that the tselem 
requires a physical, finite body in order to subsist.64 
In summation of this paper, Maharal's view of the human being is a 
blend of ideas drawn from the Scriptural, Talmudic, philosophical, and 
Kabbalistic traditions. According to Maharal, rationality, emotion, and 
physicality are all significant parts of the human being; each of these 
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parts has an important role to play in human and Jewish life. Yet, 
beyond these three parts, there is the tselem, which is the most funda-
mental, yet indefinable, aspect of human identity. While intellect, soul, 
and body must all playa role in one's relationship with God, it is ulti-
mately by virtue of the ineffable tselem that the human may develop a 
relationship or kinship with the ineffable divine essence of God. 
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such a broad sense (Tiferet Yisrael, p. 16). Finally, Maharal also claims that 
the soul (nefesh) itself has three parts (Drush Le-Shabbat Ha-Gadol, p.224). This 
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5. For Maharal's discussion of matter in general, see Gevurot Ha-Shem 
pp.29ff. 
6. In some cases, Maharal goes so far as to state that light is not material 
at all. See Nezah Yisrael p. 101, Netivot Olam, vol. II, p. 136. 
7. Gevurot Ha-Shem p. 29ff.; on Moses, see idem, p. 78. See also note 48 
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8. Tiferet Yisrael, p. 31. 
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11. Introduction to Derekh Ha-Ijayyim, p. 8. Unless otherwise indicated, 
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Philosophers," by Edward Mahoney, in Philosphies of Existence, edited by 
Morewedge (New York, 1982). 
22. Netivot Olam vol. II: p. 2. 
23. See Netivot Olam vol. II:p.126; Tiferet Yisrael pp.148-149. 
24. Drush le-Shabbat Tshuvah, p. 78. 
25. See Ibid.; Gevurot Ha-Shem, p.166; Tiferet Yisrael, p.8. 
26. Tiferet Yisrael, p.110. 
27. See Tiferet Yisrael 57-59. 
28. Tiferet Yisraei, ch. 4 
29. Tiferet Yisrael, ch. 16. 
30. Tiferet Yisrael, ch. 13, pp. 45-46. 
31. See Jewish Thought and the Scientific Revolution in the Sixteenth Century 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), pp. 28-29 
32. Ibid., p.29. 
33. Sherwin, Mystical Theology, p.60. 
34. Derekh Ha-Hayyim p. 234. 
35. As Neher remarks in Jewish Thought and the Scientific Revolution (p.32 and 
pp.34-36), here Maharal targets for criticism his contemporary R. Moshe Isserlis. 
36. In his article, Hokhmat ha-Sod u-Filosofia be-Mishnato she! ha-Maharal 
mi-Prag (in Hitgalut, Emunah, Tevunah, Halamish and Schwarcz eds., Ramat 
Gan: Bar Han University Press, 1976) Binyamim Gross starts by following 
Neher in seeing the Maharal as an antagonist of "reason" and a proponent 
of "mysticism". From what I have already said, it should be clear that I 
object to this way of framing the Maharal's position; he is an antagonist of a 
certain view held by the philosophers and a proponent of a certain view held 
by the Kabbalists. Nevertheless, I have no disagreement with the bulk the 
article, in which Gross discusses Maharal's theoretical motivations for dis-
puting the view of the philosophers on the nature of the divine attributes. 
37. Mystical Theology, p. 56. 
38. Ibid, p. 56. 
39. Maharal writes: 
"Behold, Maimonides built the foundation of his demonstration upon 
the assumption of eternal motion. But this is in opposition to the faith. 
We do not assent to this assumption. Since we cannot assent to the 
assumption, the entire demonstration collapses." 
This is Sherwin's translation of a passage in chapter 2 of Netiv ha-Shalom (in 
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completely in act .... for only God is in pure act and so God is the true 
agent .. of the motion ... .The motion [of the spheres] is from God, and thus 
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43. Tiferet Yisrael, p. 31. 
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"Tselem Elohim u-Ma' amado ke-Makor Ra' ato shel Adam lefi ha-Maharal mi-
Prag", in Oa'at, 1987:19, pp. 103-136. 
48. Gevurot Ha-Shem, p. 311; Netivot Olam, vol. II. p. 53. 
49. The clearest statement of this is in Derekh Ha-I;Iayyim, p. 142. 
Compare Tiferet Yisrael, ch. 24; Gevurot Ha-Shem, ch. 67. On p. 169 of Gevurat 
Ha-Shem, Maharal writes that the "main part of the human (ikkar ha-adam) is 
the sekhel"; but in that context, where Maharal compares the hand-phylacter-
ies <tefillin shel yad) to the head-phylacteries (tefillill shel rash), we may inter-
pret this statement in a relative sense, that is, relative to the body, the sekhel is 
the more essential part of the human. 
50. Derckh Ha-Hayyim, p. 143; Netivot Olam, vol. II. p. 53. 
51. Derekh Ha-lfayyim, p.146. Incidentally, it should be noted that, for 
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61. Tiferet Yisrael, p.75. 
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